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1 Introduction
Poverty alleviation is one of the biggest agenda in the world, especially in South Asia 
where more than 500 million people live below the poverty line (World Bank n.d.).1 
Since International Year of Microcredit was declared by the United Nations in 2005, 
microfinance has been increasingly recognized as an effective instrument of poverty 
alleviation in developing countries.
These are the fundamental reasons why financial inclusion of the the poor 
through microfinance (MF) is highlighted as one of the main instruments for 
poverty alleviation and equitable economic development in India, especially in 
rural areas where majority of BPL people live (GOI 2008; Mehrotra et al. 2009). 
Government policy to extend microfinance in rural India is presently implemented 
mainly through the SHG-Bank Linkage n.d. Program (the SHG Program) which is 
effectively put into operation by the national refinancing agency National Bank for 
Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD). This program aims to provide 
financial services of formal financial system such as savings and loan facilities to 
the poor by linking banks and Self Help Groups (SHGs), each of them formed by 
10-20 neighboring villagers, mostly by women.
As Table 1 shows, development of microfinance in India was classified as a 
medium level in South Asia, much behind Bangladesh and Sri Lanka till mid 2000s 
(World Bank 2006). However, recent fast growth of the SHG Program has achieved
1 This is the accumulated number of BPL people of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri 
Lanka, Bhutan and Maldives by international standard (1.25 PPP$ per day) as on 2010. There is 
no figure shown in the World Bank (n.d.) for Afghanistan.
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Table 1 Situation of Microfinance (MF) in South Asia
Country Poor families 
(million)
MF clients 
(million)
Ratio of MF clients to 
poor families (%)
MF coverage of 
poor families (%)
Afghanistan 2 0.12 6 3
Bangladesh 13 16 123 62
India 60 15 25 9
Nepal 1.6 0.5 31 14
Pakistan 8.5 0.58 7 2
Sri Lanka 1 2.5 250 63
Whole South Asia 86.1 34.7 40 17
Source World Bank (2006), p. 23
Notes (1) ‘‘Poor Families’’ are families subsisting on less than the government-defined poverty 
thresholds. (2) The above data are the latest available data by 2005 and include estimates of the 
authors of World Bank (2006). (3) ‘‘Ratio of MF Clients to Poor Familes’’ may exceed 100 % 
partly because one family may be clients of more than one MF institutions and partly because 
some nonpoor families may be clients of MF institutions. (4) ‘‘MF Coverage of Poor Families’’ 
are estimates of the authors of World Bank (2006)
remarkable increase of micro finance clients in India. As on March 31,2010, the SHG 
Program provides savings facility to 97 million households through 6.95 million 
SHGs (NABARD 2010), which means about 44 % of the total households in India2 
are beneficiaries of this world’s largest microfinance program (NABARD 2010). 
Thus, the ratio of SHG member households to the total poor households (63 million3) 
reaches 154 %, which surpasses the Bangladeshi figure in Table 1. Present India is, 
no doubt, one of the leading countries in the development of microfinance at least in 
terms of outreaches to rural households.
However, the degree of development of the SHG Program varies greatly across 
India due to different policies undertaken by respective states (Sriram and Ra- 
dha 2007). In general, the SHG Program is more developed in India’s southern 
states. Four southern states, namely, Andhra Pradesh (AP), Karnataka, Tamil Nadu 
and Kerala, account for 46.4 % of the total SHGs in the country, although these 
states have only 21.0 % of the India’s total population. Among them, as Table 2 
shows, AP alone accounts for 20.8 % of the total SHGs, almost three times of its 
population share of 7.2 % in the country. Significant expansion of the SHG Pro­
gram in southern India, especially in AP, becomes evident when we see the 
volume of loan disbursement by banks to SHGs. The four southern states account 
for 67.8 % of the total loan outstanding given by banks to SHGs, and AP alone
2 This figure was calculated based on the assumption that the total population in India is 1,186 
million (Government of India 2011) as on 2010, one family has on average 5.36 members (as per 
Population Census 2001), and there is one SHG member in each SHG member household.
3 This figure was calculated based on the same assumption as the above ‘‘Note 2’’, and the BPL 
ratio of 28.6 % by the national poverty line (Government of India 2011).
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represents 41.9 % of the whole country as on March 31, 2010. These figures 
clearly indicate that AP is the most notable state in terms of development of the 
SHG Program.
In contrast to the vibrancy of the SHG Program in the southern region, the 
northern and the central regions are least developed areas in terms of the SHG 
Program. Development of the SHG Program in the north-eastern, eastern and 
western regions is medium level as shown in Table 2.
2 Objectives and Methodology of the Study
2.1 Objectives of the Study
Considering the outstanding development of microfinance in AP and the expec­
tation that other states in India can learn a valuable lesson from AP (Ramesh 
2007), it is worth conducting an in-depth study on what the SHG Program of AP 
has achieved and what challenges it is facing. The in-depth study is necessary 
because, in spite of worldwide effort to develop microfinance, it is not still very 
clear how effectively and efficiently microfinance impacts on poverty reduction 
(Hermes and Lensink 2007). Indeed, other states in India as well as other countries 
which plan to embark on this exemplar program can learn a valuable lesson from 
the experience of AP through this in-depth study.
The World Bank (2006) recommends that the achievements of microfinance 
programs should be evaluated using two criteria and refers to it as ‘‘double bottom 
line’’. The first criterion is to what extent the program is contributing to poverty 
alleviation; and since poverty alleviation is the main goal of the SHG Program, 
obviously this is the primary criterion used in this study.
The second criterion is to what extent this program is sustainable, or viable in 
the long term. Because the goal of the rural financial reform is to ensure the 
inclusion of the poor in the modern financial market, that is, to provide sustainable 
financial services to the poor (Adams et al. 1984; Adams et al. 1981), the SHG 
Program should be able to stand on its own foot, at least in the long run. In AP 
State, as much as 67 % of the total refinance fund provided by NABARD, the 
national refinancing agency, to banks is used as loans to SHGs during 2009-2010. 
This fund is not costless and should be examined for its efficiency and 
sustainability.
Based on the village level data used in this study, the evaluation of the SHG 
program focuses on how effective the SHG Program is for poverty alleviation and 
what problems it has at grass root level. Investigation of the efficiency criterion, 
namely ‘‘efficiency and sustainability of the SHG Program as a poverty alleviation 
program’’, needs broader discussions such as subsidy dependence index (SDI), 
which is beyond the scope of the data available in this study.
2.2 Methodology of the Study
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This chapter addresses the essential question: ‘‘how effective is the SHG Program 
for poverty alleviation and what critical challenges is it facing?’’ Analysis will be 
based on the household data collected using personal interviews and survey 
instruments in two villages, one each in the states of Andhra Pradesh and 
Maharashtra of India. The data collected from selected households and all SHGs in 
the study villages included relevant information related to the SHG membership 
and activities. The household and SHG data are supplemented by information 
gathered from key informants and other stakeholders including bank staff. The two 
survey villages were selected from among six villages in which the International 
Crops Research Institute for Semi-arid Tropics (ICRISAT) has been conducting 
the Village Level Surveys (VLS) longitudinal household panel survey since 1975. 
A comparative analysis is undertaken by considering one village in Maharashtra as 
the control village where the SHG Program has not been actively implemented 
versus the study village in AP where the dynamics of the success of the SHG 
program is distinctly experienced. By comparing the two villages, we examine 
how and to what extent the SHG Program can change villagers’ life and what 
measures are required to develop the SHG Program further. Available data from 
the VLS longitudinal panel are also used to present a better understanding of the 
village level dynamics with respect to availability of credit to women and the 
individual/household/village poverty alleviation and empowerment.
3 Situation of the SHG Program in AP and Maharashtra
Across all the states in India, AP State is a front runner of the SHG Program. The 
latest data indicate that there are 995 thousand SHGs and 11.1 million members in 
AP as of November 2011. The members are exclusively women (SERP 2011). 
This means that the ratio of rural households having SHG member reaches 82 %4 
in AP state.
As shown earlier in Table 2, the share of AP in the national total loan out­
standing given by banks to SHGs reaches 41.9 % (based on the update of March 
31, 2010), which is significantly higher than the AP to All-India population share 
of 7.2 %. Moreover, we should pay attention to the high ratio of SHGs getting 
loans from banks. The same table shows that the number of SHGs having loan
4 This estimate is based on the following assumptions. The total population of AP state is 84.7 
million (as per Population Census 2011), of which 72.7 % live in rural area (as per Population 
Census 2001). Each household in AP state consists of an average of 4.52 family members (as per 
Population Census 2001). SHGs exist only in rural area. There is only one SHG member in a 
household. However, these assumptions would give an overestimation of SHG member 
households, because some households have more than one SHG member (say a mother and a 
daughter or daughter-in-law).
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outstanding from banks is, unlike other regions, almost equal to the number of 
SHGs having savings in banks. This means that almost all SHGs and their 
members in AP State can get loans continuously from banks.
High recovery ratio of loan in AP State is also notable. The ratio of Nonper­
forming Assets (NPA) against the loan outstanding is only 1.3 %, much lower than 
the national average of 2.9 % and Maharashtra of 4.7 %. In contrast to the com­
mon problem of low repayment ratio which most of rural financial institutions and 
programs are suffering in India, the SHG Program in AP is exceptionally healthy 
as a government financial program in terms of repayment ratio.
These remarkable achievements of the SHG Program in AP are greatly attributed 
to the strong commitment of the state government. The AP Government has 
empowered an integrated program called ‘‘Indira Kranti Patham (Indira Revolu­
tionary Way)’’, which includes the former Development of Women and Children in 
Rural Areas (DWCRA) Program and Velugu (Light) Program, with a central focal 
position for enabling anti rural poverty policies (Government of Andhra Pradesh 
n.d.). As a result, the SHG Program (SHG-Bank Linkage Program) became one of 
the major components of Indira Kranti Patham which then provides various social 
and economic services to the rural women through SHGs. In addition, the AP 
Government has set up a special agency called Society for Elimination of Rural 
Poverty (SERP) to implement Indira Kranti Patham. At the village level, SHGs are 
federated to Village Organizations (VOs) under the support of SERP; and VOs in 
turn work as facilitators of the SHG program by disseminating the merits of SHGs 
in the village, thus helping women in establishing SHGs, and connecting SHGs 
with banks and supporting capacity building for SHG management (including book 
keeping and settlement of problems) to ensure long-term viability.
Maharashtra State, where another survey village is located, has a relatively 
lower level of the SHG Program’s development and utilization. Historically, the 
cooperative movement has been quite strong in this state and the government’s 
efforts to deliver financial services to rural area have been mainly pursued by 
credit cooperatives (Primary Agricultural Credit Societies (PACS) and District 
Central Cooperative Banks (DCCB)). This may be one reason for the Maharashtra 
Government for not proactively promoting the SHG Program. The relatively 
stagnant SHG Program in Maharashtra is evident from the following indicators. 
First, the share of SHGs formed in Maharashtra in the whole country (11.1 %) is 
almost same as its share of population (9.4 %). Second, the share of Maharashtra’s 
outstanding bank loans to SHGs (4.3 %) in the whole India is much less than that 
of population. Third, it is also noted that the number of SHGs having loan out­
standing from banks (0.39 million) is much less than the SHGs having savings in 
banks (0.77 million). This means that SHGs and their members in Maharashtra 
cannot get loans from banks as easily as in AP. Additionally, the NPA ratio of this 
state is 4.7 %, much higher than AP of 1.3 %. These figures indicate that loans to 
the rural poor through SHGs are not flowing smoothly and there is a serious non 
repayment problem in this program in Maharashtra.
A significant disadvantage of the Maharashtra’s SHG Program in comparison to 
the program in AP is the absence of a special government organization such as
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SERP of AP to support the SHG Program systematically. It is observed that where 
proper supporting NGOs or voluntary supporting persons are available even in 
maharashtra, they may work as intermediary or facilitator of this program by 
bridging banks and SHGs and supporting the activities of SHGs. But where such 
NGOs or persons are not available, bank staff themselves must visit villages to 
organize and support SHGs. The results of these differences in policy of the two 
states are presented in the next section.
4 Field Observations and Analyses
4.1 Background on the Study Villages
The locations of the case study villages in the states of Andhra Pradesh and 
Maharashtra are shown in Fig. 1. As stated earlier, these villages were selected 
from among six villages in which International Crops Research Institute for Semi- 
arid Tropics (ICRISAT) has been conducting household survey since the 
mid1970s. Household data used in this chapter were mainly collected by ICRISAT 
staff stationed in the respective study villages.
The study village in AP (hereafter stated ‘‘Village A’’) has 766 households with 
a population of 3,563 in 2008. As Table 3 shows, the Gouda Caste, a scheduled 
caste (SC) whose traditional occupation is toddy collection, is the largest caste 
group in the village and accounts for 23.9 % of the total village population. This is 
followed by the Madiga SC (leather work), Kurma SC (shepherd), Mala SC 
(agricultural laborer), Vaddera (stonecutters; backward caste (BC)); and the Reddy 
(farming; forward caste (FC)) etc. Distance from the state capital Hyderabad is 
about 70 km and villagers’ life is changing quickly due to the influence of this fast 
developing mega city. These changes include emigration to Hyderabad for job and
Fig. 1 Locations of the 
study villages, source 
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change of cropping pattern from sorghum, pearl millet, and pigeon pea to vege­
table and Bt. cotton. Traditional toddy business and livestock rearing are also 
prospering than before due to the increase of demand with the increase of 
household incomes.
The study village in Maharashtra (hereafter called ‘‘Village M’’) has 546 
households and the total population of 2,518 as of 2008. The Maratha Caste 
(farming: FC) accounts for 45.8 % and Shepherd Caste (BC) 19.0 % of the total 
households. Thus these two castes form the majority of the village. Then, Mahar 
(service: SC, 8.4 %), Holer (leather work and cleaning: SC, 4.4 %), and others 
follow. This village is located near to the trunk road connecting fast growing mega 
cities, namely Pune, Mumbai, and Hyderabad. And recently, much of the land was 
covered by canal irrigation scheme, which changed the cropping pattern of the 
village drastically from sorghum and chickpea to sugarcane, wheat, and vegetable. 
The good road access and the availability of water through canal irrigation have 
been observed to drive the faster pace of the economic growth and to give 
opportunities for diversification of economy in this village.
As for the landholding structure, these two villages are in a similar situation in 
terms of the average agricultural landholding size being 1.3 ha. However, the 
magnitude of landless households is quite different. The share of households 
having no agricultural land (landless) is much higher in Village M (42 %) than in 
Village A (17 %). This suggests that the poverty may be more severe in Village M 
than in Village A.
4.2 Development of the SHG Program in the Study Villages
The SHG Program started in the study villages in early 2000s. In the Village A, the 
first SHG was formed in the year 2000, while in Village M the first SHG was 
formed in 2003. The number of operating SHG is 46 in Village A and 14 in Village 
M. The total numbers of SHG members (all women) are 643 and 142 in the 
respective villages, which means that 84 and 26 % of the total households in the 
respective villages participate in the SHG Program assuming that each member 
household has only one SHG member. Thus, the SHG Program is much more 
widely spread in the Village A than in the Village M (Fig. 2).
4.3 Analyses of the Household Data
(a) Outreach to the Poor
(i) Characteristics of the SHG Members
In order to examine the achievements and limitations of the SHG Program, 
analyses were based on the detailed data of 70 households in Village A and 89 
households in Village M which have been generated through the ICRISAT VLS
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Fig. 2 Growth of the SHG Program in the Study Villages. Source Survey conducted in 2010. 
Note The numbers of SHGs and their members in respective years are those calculated by the 
established years of the presently working SHGs. Collapsed SHGs in the past and their members 
are not reflected in this figure. Therefore, the actual numbers of SHGs and their members in the 
respective years may be different from the numbers shown in this figure
longitudinal household panel surveys (see ICRISAT website on www.icrisat.org 
for description of the different VLS modules and other relevant information).
As Table 4 shows, majority of surveyed households (74.3 %) are SHG mem­
bers in Village A. Interestingly, however, despite the main goal of this program 
being poverty alleviation, most of upper class households are found to be partic­
ipating in the program while most of nonmembers belong to landless, marginal, 
and small landholding classes.
The data of Village M show the same result. That is, majority of the landless 
and small landholders are not included in the SHG Program, while many upper 
class households are benefiting from it. Seemingly, this program has failed to 
target the poor section of the rural society.
Landholding sizes of the member and nonmember households shown in the 
Table 5 confirm the above observation that SHG members are relatively rich 
households compared with nonmember households. The average landholding of 
member households is larger than nonmember households. But the median values 
of the member household and the nonmember household groups show little dif­
ference. This indicates that big landholders are included more often in member 
households than in nonmember households as the largest landholding sizes of 
member and nonmember households in the respective villages show.
Table 6 shows the relationship between the SHG Program and the main 
occupations of household heads. The result tells that the SHG Program covers all
Table 4 Relationship between landholding size and participation ratio in the SHG program
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Member of SHG Nonmember of SHG Total
Number Ratio Number Ratio Number Ratio
of HH (%) of HH (%) of HH (%)
Village A: Total 52 74.3 18 25.7 70 100.0
Landless 3 50.0 3 50.0 6 100.0
Marginal 17 85.0 3 15.0 20 100.0
Small 9 50.0 9 50.0 18 100.0
Small medium 15 83.3 3 16.7 18 100.0
Medium 8 100.0 0 0.0 8 100.0
Village M: Total 24 27.0 65 73.0 89 100.0
Landless 4 22.2 14 77.8 18 100.0
Marginal 5 29.4 12 70.6 17 100.0
Small 8 30.8 18 69.2 26 100.0
Small medium 4 20.0 16 80.0 20 100.0
Medium 3 37.5 5 62.5 8 100.0
Total 76 47.8 83 52.2 159 100.0
Source Survey conducted in 2010
Note Each household is classified into Landless (no agricultural land), Marginal (0.01-0.09 ha), 
Small (1.00-1.99 ha), Small-Medium (2.00-3.99 ha), Medium (4.00-9.99 ha), and Large 
(10.00 ha and above) according to the size of own agricultural land. There is no ‘‘large farmer’’ in 
the surveyed households
Table 5 Landholding size of member and nonmember households of the SHG program
Village A Village M
Member HHs 
(52 HHs)
Nonmember 
HHs (18 HHs)
Member HHs 
(24 HHs)
Non member 
HHs (65 HHs)
Average land holding (ha) 1.9 1.1 2.2 1.5
Median (ha) 1.4 1.1 1.2 1.1
Largest landholding (ha) 5.6 2.8 9.9 6.7
Source Survey conducted in 2010. ICRISAT VLS data base
kind of occupations almost evenly in both villages and shows no concentration on 
particular occupations.
In general, agricultural laborer households form the bottom of rural society. 
Therefore, the SHG Program should focus on this occupation along with other 
deprived sections. However, in both villages, the participation ratio of agricultural 
laborer households in the SHG Program is not visibly high. In other words, many 
agricultural labor households are excluded from this anti-poverty program. The 
reason the poorest of the poor do not participate in the SHG Program will be 
examined more carefully in the latter part of this chapter.
Table 6 Main occupations of household heads and participation ratio in the SHG program
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Member
household
Nonmember
household
Total
Number 
of HH
Ratio
(%)
Number Ratio 
of HH (%)
Number 
of HH
Ratio
(%)
Village A: Total 52 74.3 18 25.7 70 100.0
Agriculture (Cultivation) 29 80.6 7 19.4 36 100.0
Livestock rearing 2 50.0 2 50.0 4 100.0
Agriculture Laborer 12 70.6 5 29.4 17 100.0
Non agriculture self employed 3 60.0 2 40.0 5 100.0
Non agriculture Permanent employee 4 100.0 0 0.0 4 100.0
Non agriculture day laborer 0 -  0 - 0 -
No job 2 50.0 2 50.0 4 100.0
Village M: Total 24 27.0 65 73.0 89 100.0
Agriculture (Cultivation) 9 25.7 26 74.3 35 100.0
Livestock rearing 1 20.0 4 80.0 5 100.0
Agriculture laborer 5 29.4 12 70.6 17 100.0
Non agriculture self employed 3 21.4 11 78.6 14 100.0
Non agriculture permanent employee 3 27.3 8 72.7 11 100.0
Non agriculture day laborer 1 33.3 2 66.7 3 100.0
No job 2 50.0 2 50.0 4 100.0
Total 76 47.8 83 52.2 159 100.0
Source Survey conducted in 2010
Table 7 Caste and SHG participation
Member household Nonmember household Total
Number Ratio Number Ratio Number Ratio
of HH (%) of HH (%) of HH (%)
Village A: Total 52 74.3 18 25.7 70 100.0
Forward caste (FC) 5 71.4 2 28.6 7 100.0
Backward caste (BC) 30 71.4 12 28.6 42 100.0
Scheduled caste (SC) 17 81.0 4 19.0 21 100.0
Village M: Total 24 27.0 65 73.0 89 100.0
Forward caste (FC) 12 22.2 42 77.8 54 100.0
Backward caste (BC) 10 40.0 15 60.0 25 100.0
Scheduled caste (SC) 2 20.0 8 80.0 10 100.0
Total 76 47.8 83 52.2 159 100.0
Source Survey conducted in 2010
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Likewise, it seems there is no particular relationship between the SHG Program 
and particular castes (Table 7). The SHG Program covers all castes almost evenly 
in the Village A, although the participation ratio of scheduled castes (SC) is 
slightly higher than the average. Participation ratio of SC in Village M is less than 
the average. And half of the total SHG members belong to forward castes (FC).
In conclusion, the above village-level evidences suggest that the SHG Program, 
so far, is not functioning well to deliver financial services to the poorest section of 
the rural society even in AP. While this program is open to all classes of the rural 
society, many nonpoor households and upper classes are more often enjoying the 
benefit of this program.
(ii) Reasons the Poor do not join the SHG Program
One natural question is ‘‘why many people, especially the poor, do not join the 
SHG Program?’’ As Table 8 indicates, the biggest reason majority of nonmember 
households do not join the SHG Program in Village A is that ‘‘There is no money 
to save’’. Since the SHG Program is, unlike Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, 
‘‘Savings First, Loan Later’’ type of microfinance program, it is difficult for the 
very poor households which have no saving capacity to join the program even if 
they wish to.
The second major reason of not joining this program is that ‘‘Husband does not 
encourage (to join SHG)’’. This means there is still a psychological resistance in 
rural society at least for some men to let their wives go out for SHG activities.
The third common reason is that a woman who wishes to join the program is too 
old to be eligible for SHG’ membership. Since there is an age limit for SHG 
members, women over 60 years old are not able to join SHGs.
In conclusion, due to economic, social and institutional restriction, some 
women, especially poor and old women are excluded from this program even 
though they want to join it. Among these problems, poverty is the biggest reason 
for nonmember households’ exclusion from this program. Here lies a contradiction 
that the SHG Program, in spite of being a poverty alleviation program, tends to 
exclude its target beneficiary due to (a) lack of the poor sector’s adaptive capacity; 
as well as (b) ability of the elite to capture a whole range of beneficial development 
programs.
Another important result which is of interest in this study relates to the major 
reasons why majority of villagers in village M do not join the SHG program. Their 
commonest answer to this question is that they are not interested in this program.
Table 8 Main reasons nonmembers do not join SHGs
Not
interested
No money 
to save
Husband doesn’t 
encourage
Over the 
age limit
Others Total
Village A (HH) 0 9 5 3 1 18
Village M (HH) 59 3 0 0 0 62
Total (HH) 59 12 5 2 1 80
Source Survey conducted in 2010
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How should we interpret this answer? Interviews with some villagers revealed that 
attending monthly meeting of SHGs held in daytime for collection of savings and 
repayment of loans is taken as troublesome and waste of time especially for the 
poor who work on the field as agricultural laborers. Moreover, many people do not 
trust SHGs for safety of their savings due to experiences of collapse of several 
SHGs in the past. One informant revealed that 22 SHGs had been formed in this 
village but only 14 groups were working at the time of the survey (May 2010). The 
main reasons of SHGs’ collapse are, according to the statement of villagers, that 
some members did not make repayment of their loans and did not save regularly. 
Conflicts among members regarding management of SHGs were also one of the 
major reasons of SHGs’ collapse. In a word, SHGs in Village M are not working 
properly to make their members observe financial contracts and to solve conflicts 
among members.
On the contrary, collapse of SHGs is reportedly very rare in Village A. There is 
only one case that SHG stopped its activity because of conflict among members. 
However, after the leader of the group was replaced it started to work properly 
again.
Therefore, the question why many SHGs have collapsed in Village M arises as 
an important issue to understand the situation of the SHG Program in this village. 
This problem will be discussed again later.
(b) Effect of the SHG Program on Poverty Alleviation
(i) Financial Inclusion of the Poor by the SHG Program 
We have seen that the SHG Program covers the majority of rural households in 
AP, while its outreach to rural people in Maharashtra is much less. So what results 
does the different outreach of the SHG Program in the two states make?
As Table 9 shows, the SHG Program has contributed to inclusion of many poor 
households having no or little land which were otherwise excluded from the formal 
finance in Village A. Over 31 % (22 households) of the total surveyed households, 
whose average landholding (0.8 ha) is much less than the average of the total 
surveyed households (1.7 ha), report that SHG is the only loan source from the 
formal financial sector. Similarly, 14.3 % of the surveyed households, again many 
of them are poor (average landholding 1.1 ha), answered that SHG is the sole 
means of savings in the formal financial sector. Thus, the spread of the SHG 
Program in Village A has contributed to the poor by including substantial part of 
the poor in the formal financial system.
However, we should not overlook the fact that there are still many poor 
households which are excluded from the formal finance. In Village A, nearly one- 
fourth (23 %) of the total surveyed households, many of them are poor in terms of 
landholding (average landholding 0.9 ha), still do not have access to the formal 
financial institutions.
As observed in the earlier section, inclusion of the poor in the formal financial 
sector through the SHG program in Village M has been constrained. Only four
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Village A Village M
Number of 
households
Percentage
(%)
Average
landholding
(ha)
Number of 
households
Percentage
(%)
Average
landholding
(ha)
Total households 70 100.0 1.7 89 100.0 1.6
No formal loan 
including SHG
16 22.9 0.9 35 39.3 1.3
Form al Loan only 
from  SHG
22 31.4 0.8 4 4.5 0.6
Formal loan both 
from SHG and 
other formal 
institution/s
26 37.1 2.9 7 7.8 2.1
Formal loan other 
than SHG
6 8.6 1.5 43 48.3 1.9
No savings in 
formal 
institution/s
4 5.7 0.1 3 3.4 0.0
Savings in formal 
institution/s
66 94.3 1.8 86 96.6 1.7
Form al savings 
only in SHG
10 14.3 1.1 0 0.0 —
Source Survey conducted in 2010
Note Formal institutions include SHG, bank, cooperative, chit fund, post office, financial com­
pany, micro finance other than SHGs, pawn shop, etc
households (4.5 % of the total surveyed households) could obtain access to the 
formal financial sector by joining the SHG Program. In most cases, the SHG 
Program only provided additional loan sources to households which already had 
access to formal loans such as credit cooperatives and banks. On the other hand, 
39.3 % (35 households) of the total surveyed households in Village M, many of 
them belong to the poor section inferred by their small landholding size (1.3 ha), 
are still left outside of the formal financial system in terms of access to loans, 
while most of the villagers have access to savings facilities in the formal sector. 
Although credit cooperatives in Maharashtra provide savings facility to all vil­
lagers, one must own at least one acre (0.4 ha) of agricultural land in order to be 
eligible for membership and to obtain loans. But as we have seen already, more 
than 40 % of the households in Village M are landless. Thus, the landless villagers 
generally do not have access to formal loans. Their loan sources are mostly 
friends/relatives and shopkeepers. These loans and advances are given usually free 
of interest but the amount is very little. Therefore, the biggest contribution 
expected for the SHG Program as a poverty alleviation program is to give financial
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services, especially loans to the landless poor who are left outside of the coop­
erative system and in short of loan sources. But we must conclude that the SHG 
Program has failed to meet this expectation in Village M.
(ii) Position of the SHG Program in Rural Financial Market
In spite of general expectation that development of microfinance would elim­
inate dependency of the poor on informal finance especially usurious money 
lenders, the share of SHGs in the total financial market is very limited even in 
Village A. As Table 10 shows, shares of SHG loan and savings in the total loan 
and savings of the surveyed households are only 5.7 and 6.5 %, respectively. In 
Village M, the share of SHG on the villager’s loan and savings portfolio is much 
less, only 0.9 and 4.9 %, respectively. This fact implies that the SHG Program has 
very limited impact on the rural economy as a whole even in Village A where 
majority of households participate in the SHG Program.
However, all households do not join the SHG Program and the impact of the 
program may be greater for the member households. So we divided the surveyed 
households into SHG nonmember households and SHG member households to see 
the impact of the SHG Program on the member households. Amount of loan and 
savings outstanding of SHG for each SHG member households are on average 
5,900 Rs and 3,300 Rs, respectively in Village A and 1,800 Rs and 5,000 Rs, 
respectively in Village M. However, even for member households, shares of SHG 
loan and savings among their total loan and savings are only 7.2, 7.7 % respec­
tively in Village A and 2.3, 14.6 % in Village M. Therefore, impact of the SHG 
Program is minor even for SHG member households.
The major loan sources and means of savings are quite different between the 
two villages. This is clearly a reflection of the governments’ different policies and 
partly a difference of culture between AP and Maharashtra. The major differences 
of financial structure between the two villages are the role of cooperative sector 
and informal finance. The major loan sources in the Village A are still informal 
loans, especially from usurious money lenders (40 % of the total) who charge 
33 % of annual interest rate on average. Interest rate of moneylenders’ loan is 
much higher than those of the SHG Program charging 12 or 24 %. The former
Table 10 Share of SHGs in the rural financial market
Village A Village M Total
Average loan outstanding of the total 76.2 55.2 64.4
households (1,000 Rs)
of which, SHG loans (1,000 Rs) 4.36 0.48 2.19
Share of SHG loan in loan outstanding 5.7 0.9 3.4
of the total households (%)
Average savings of the total households in 38.1 27.8 32.3
financial institutions (1,000 Rs)
of which, SHG savings (1,000 Rs) 2.47 1.36 1.85
Share of SHG savings in the total 6.5 4.9 5.7
savings in financial institutions (%)
Source Survey conducted in 2010
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Fig. 3 Source wise average Loan and Savings of SHG Member Households (Outstanding). 
Source Survey conducted in 2010. Note LIC stands for ‘‘Life Insurance Corporation of India’’
interest rate is applied for the loan provided by bank fund and the latter for the loan 
provided by members’ own savings, that is, internal loans. Unlike Village M where 
no interest is charged on loans from friends/relatives, loans are also charged high 
interest of 29 % on average in Village A. This suggests us that there is a big 
cultural difference regarding mutual credit among friends/relatives between the 
two survey villages, which even may be a difference between the north and south 
India. It is surprising that dominance of moneylenders in Village A has not 
changed very much since last 30 years or so (See Table 7.2 of Walker and Ryan 
1990), even after the remarkable development of the SHG Program and banks.
In this sense, the SHG Program in AP has had a very limited success on 
replacing usurious loans. Other financial institutions like banks, chit fund, and 
insurance (Life Insurance Corporation of India) are playing far bigger roles in 
Village A as loan sources and means of savings.
On the other hand, cooperative sectors, namely, Primary Agricultural Credit 
Societies (PACSs) and District Central Cooperative Banks (DCCBs), are the major 
loan sources and means of savings in Village M reflecting the long history of 
strong cooperative movement in Maharashtra (Walker and Ryan 1990). Banks 
(commercial banks, regional rural banks) and finance companies have also
81.5
Village A (Loan) Vilalge A (Savings) Vilalge M (Loan) Village M (Savings)
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appeared as major loan providers and means of savings. The role of the SHG 
Program as a source of loan is negligible as Fig. 3 clearly shows even for SHG 
member households. The SHG Program is playing a rather bigger role as means of 
savings as SHG’s local name ‘‘Bachat Ghat (savings group)’’ rightly indicates.
(iii) The Use of Loan
Although SHGs have a very limited share in rural financial market, it may have 
an important effect on poverty alleviation depending on the ways loans are used. 
Therefore, before we conclude hastily that the impact of the SHG Program on 
poverty alleviation is negligible, we should discuss the qualitative aspects of this 
program.
Table 11 shows that how SHG loans are used in Village A and Village M. 
Notice that these data are the present loans of all SHG members in both villages.5 
This table shows that the major uses of SHG loans in Village A are agricultural 
production (crop production), livestock purchase, repayment of other loans, 
business, house construction/repair, social ceremony, and so on. The major uses in 
Village M are agricultural production, house expenditure and ceremony/marriage. 
The share of loans used for house expenditure (purchase of food etc.) is high in 
Village M. Perhaps it is because bank loans are not easily available and sources of 
SHG loans in Village M are often members’ own savings (internal loan). Amount 
of internal loans are usually little as the average amount of loan outstanding from 
SHGs 3,900 Rs shows. Therefore, internal loans do not satisfy villagers’ credit 
need.
As seen above, the use of SHG loans is quite diversified and different between 
the two villages. However, apart from whether loans are used for productive 
purposes or consumption purposes, most of SHG loans are used for betterment of 
the members’ life.
(iv) Interest Rates of SHG Loans
For loan seekers, interest rate is an important criterion for selection of loan 
sources. And the level of interest rates influences greatly the life of borrowers and 
the ways of loan use.
If interest rate is extremely high, it would trouble the borrowers’ life because 
he/she has to pay a huge amount as interest at the time of repayment, which 
sometimes surpasses the principal and drives the borrower to lose important assets 
like land and impoverish him/her or even to commit suicide. And high interest 
loans usually cannot be used for investment purposes, because profits from 
investment in agriculture and businesses are usually not so high as to allow bor­
rowers to pay 30 or 40 % of annual interest rates.
But if the interest is low, borrowers can easily repay the loan without trouble 
and can invest the loan for long-term investment such as buying agricultural land, 
tractors, installing a tube-well and starting new businesses etc.
5 The reason the data of the total SHG members in the two villages are shown here is that the 
number of loans from SHGs is very limited, especially in Village M. Therefore, we cannot 
understand correctly for what purposes SHG loans are used if we only use the data of the 
surveyed households.
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Table 12 shows the interest rates of loans borrowed by the households at the 
time of the survey. Interest rates of loans are quite various depending on the 
sources and the village. In Village A, pawn brokers, money lenders, shopkeepers, 
and friends/relatives charge high interest rates of around 30 to 40 % annually. 
Among various loan sources, SHGs (Bank Fund) offer the cheapest loan along 
with banks and PACS. Even the interest rate of SHGs’ internal loans is lower than 
most of informal loans. Another great merit of SHGs’ internal loans is that the 
interest charged is distributed equally among all members as a profit of SHG. 
Therefore, it is easily understandable that SHG loan is highly appreciated among 
villagers.
SHG loans, however, have a totally different meaning in Village M. Surpris­
ingly, the loan which charges the highest interest rate is SHGs in Village M. 
Common loan sources in this village are shopkeepers, friends/relatives, and banks 
and their interest is nil in case of borrowing from shopkeepers and friends/relatives 
and only 12.5 % for loans from banks. Interest rate of loans from PACS is even 
lower (6.5 %). Compared with these common loan sources, interest rate charged 
by internal loans of SHGs (24 %) is the highest level in this village. And lower 
interest loans from banks are not easily available as the number of loanees of SHG 
(Bank Fund) being only 3 as Table 12 shows. Relatively high interest rate of SHG
Table 12 Source wise interest rates of loans and the number of borrowers
Source of loan Village A (70 HH) Village M (89 HH)
Average annual 
interest rate (%)
Number of 
loanees (HH)
Average annual 
interest rate (%)
Number of 
loanees (HH)
SHG (Bank Fund) 12.0 43 14.0 3
SHG (Own Fund) 24.0 11 24.0 8
SHG (average) 14.4 48 21.3 11
Bank 11.6 27 12.5 49
PACS 12.0 8 6.5 11
Chit fund 24.0 16 n.a. 0
Pawn broker 42.0 8 n.a. 0
Finance company 18.0 1 14.0 5
Micro finance 20.3 8 n.a. 0
Dairy company/owner n.a. 0 0.0 16
Money lender 33.3 43 n.a. 0
Friends/relatives 28.6 13 0.0 62
Shopkeeper 30.9 14 0.0 74
Source Survey conducted in 2010
Note ‘‘Average Annual Interest Rates’’ were calculated by simple averages of interest rate of each 
loan except ‘‘SHG (average)’’ which were calculated by average interest rate and numbers of 
loanees of ‘‘SHG (Bank Fund)’’ and ‘‘SHG (Own Fund)’’ (internal loans)
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Table 13 Effect of the SHG program on life improvement
Question: Has your life improved by joining SHG ?
Village A Village M Total
Yes, very much 10 (19.2 %) 2 (8.3 %) 12 (15.8 %)
Yes, but not much 24 (46.2 %) 16(66.7 %) 40 (52.6 %)
No change 17 (32.7 %) 4(16.7 %) 21 (27.6 %)
Life worsend 0 (0.0 %) 0 (0.0 %) 0 (0.0 %)
No answer 1 (1.9 %) 2 (8.3 %) 3 (3.9 %)
Total 52 (100.0 %) 24 (100.0 %) 76 (100.0 %)
Source Survey conducted in 2010
loans must be one of the main reasons, the SHG Program is not popular and some 
SHGs have collapsed because of default of SHG members in Village M. If this is 
true, relative high interest rate charged by SHGs is diminishing its own market as 
Stiglitz and Weiss argued the effect of ‘‘adverse selection’’ caused by high interest 
rate (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981).
It is true that there are moneylenders who charge 60 % of annual interest rate in 
village M. But fortunately very few people go for them nowadays. In our surveyed 
households, there was no borrower from such usurious money lenders.
(v) Effect of the SHG Program on Life Improvement 
So the next question arises. If SHG loans are used for necessary purposes and 
interest rate is low in Village A, is the SHG Program improving the life of the 
members? If ‘‘yes’’, to what extent? To this question one-fifth (19.2 %) of SHG 
member households in Village A answered that their life has improved ‘‘very 
much’’ due to the SHG Program (Table 13). If we include ‘‘Improved, but not 
much’’, 65 % of member households answered that their life has improved at least 
to some extent due to the SHG Program.
Likewise, in Village M, 75 % of the total member households appreciate the 
effect of the SHG Program on their life. But the ratio of member households which 
answered that the SHG Program has improved their life ‘‘very much’’ is consid­
erably lower (8 %) than Village A (19 %). Lower appreciation of members on this 
program in Village M may be attributed to the less chance of getting low interest 
bank loans and high interest rate charged for internal loans. Nonavailability of 
other services like subsidized gas, pension scheme and scholarship for children, 
which the SHG Program in AP offers to SHG members is probably another cause 
of low satisfaction from this program in village M.
However, it should be also noticed that no member household answered that 
her/his life has worsened because of joining the SHG Program. Readers of this 
chapter may think this answer is a matter of course. But we must remember that 
some microfinance providers in AP State have recently caused suicide of poor 
borrowers by putting heavy pressure on them for recovery of loans (Sriram 2010). 
The SHG Program in AP is a great success in that it realizes almost 100 % 
recovery without making such problems. The main reason of this success seems to
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Table 14 Villagers’ perception of the SHG program
Village A Village M
Number of SHG member households 52 24
Number of households wishing to 51 23
continue SHG activities
Ratio of SHG HHs wishing to 98.1 95.8
continue SHG activities (%)
Biggest reason SHG members wish to continue SHG activities
Biggest reason Low interest loan (47), Savings (18),
Savings (2) Safe savings 
(3),
Easy procedure 
(1)
Second biggest reason Savings (34), Pension (9), Savings (3),
Subsidized gas (3) Safe savings 
(2), Availability 
of loan (2)
Third biggest reason Pension (17), Subsidized gas (16), 
Education scholarship (9)
Biggest reason non SHG No money to save (9), Husband Not interested (59),
members don’t wish doesn’t encourage (5) No money to
to join SHGs save (3)
Source Survey conducted in 2010
Note Numbers in parentheses are the numbers of households answered
be that SHGs in AP are functioning as effective and flexible peer monitoring 
organizations 6(See Stiglitz 1990).
(c) Factors to improve the SHG Program
(i) Members’ Perception of the SHG Program
How do villagers perceive the SHG program? As Table 14 shows, most of the 
present SHG members wish to continue SHG activities. This means that the SHG 
Program gives at least some benefit to most of members and the benefit they get is 
bigger than the cost they pay. And for most of members, the major benefits they 
get from this program are ‘‘low interest loan’’ and ‘‘means of safe savings’’ in 
Village A. Other than low interest loans from banks, monthly small savings of 
50-100 Rs are also appreciated by most of members, because they can get fairly a 
big amount of money from own savings and the SHGs’ profit when SHGs divide 
the savings and profit equally among members after several years of operation.
6 Information from SHG leaders of Village A and M revealed that collecting repayment of loans 
and savings regularly was the biggest problem of SHGs’ management. Some borrowers and 
members cannot or don’t want to repay and save regularly due to various reasons. In such cases, 
SHGs allow members to postpone the repayment of loans and monthly savings up to certain limit. 
But finally most of SHGs realize 100 % of repayment. This shows that at least existing SHGs are 
working as a flexible and strong recovery system.
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In addition to these basic financial services, other poverty alleviation schemes 
of the AP Government like ‘‘pension scheme’’, ‘‘subsidized gas’’, and ‘‘scholarship 
for children’s education’’ are provided through SHGs as parts of Indira Kranti 
Patham Program. They are additional incentives for rural women to participate in 
the SHG Program. Thus, the SHG Program is considered as a beneficial program 
by most of rural households in Village A.
While positive feedback has been expressed in Village A, majority of villagers 
in Village M including the landless poor who do not have access to the formal 
financial institutions do not recognize the merit of joining the SHG Program. How 
does cultural and governance factors explain this observation? The main reason of 
the unpopularity of this program in Village M is that it is difficult to get low 
interest bank loans through SHGs. There is also a risk that they may lose their 
savings in SHGs due to collapse of SHGs. In Village M or more generally 
speaking in Maharashtra State, scarcity of bank loans from SHGs and weak 
management of SHGs seems to be the two sides of the same coin. Banks do not 
give loans to SHGs easily, because SHGs are not well managed and possibility of 
loan default is high as NPA (Nonperforming Assets) ratio of Maharashtra in 
Table 2 shows. And some SHG members do not want to repay their loans, because 
the chance to get the next bank loan is low and interest rate of internal loans 
(24 %) is much higher compared with other formal loans from PACS and bank 
loans (6.5-12.5 %). In addition, credit from friends and relatives are usually free 
of interest. Therefore, many SHG members try to escape from repayment of their 
loans. The bad culture nourished by frequent loan waivers (See Walker and Ryan 
1990, Chap. 7) may be one of the reasons that SHG members try to escape from 
loan repayment. These various factors altogether deteriorate the management of 
SHGs. Thus, weak management of SHGs and less availability of loans from banks 
are making vicious circle in Village M and Maharashtra State, which loses interest 
and expectation of villagers for the SHG Program.
(ii) Necessary Measures to Enhance the Effect of the SHG Program
In the above analyses, we have examined the achievements of the SHG Pro­
gram and found that it is generally considered to be a good and effective program 
for improvement of villager’s life in spite of its limited impact. So what measures 
are necessary to enhance its effect of poverty alleviation?
In Village A, more generally speaking in AP State, one necessary measure 
would be to enlarge its coverage, that is, to expand its membership to the poorer 
section of the society. Many poor people are still excluded from this program due 
to problems caused by defects of program design. Since many other anti-poverty 
programs are also delivered to the villagers through SHGs, exclusion of the poorest 
people from the SHG Program may widen the gap between the poorest and other 
section of the rural society. Therefore, inclusion of the poorest of the poor into this 
program by tuning up the program design is of urgent necessity.
Another effective measure would be to provide bigger and more frequent bank 
loans to meet the demand of SHG members. To the question asking the most 
expected measures for development of the SHG Program, 25 leaders among 47 
SHGs answered ‘‘large and more frequent loans’’ in Village A. It is necessary to
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widen the loan pipe and smooth the credit flow from banks especially to those 
villagers who do not have another access to formal finance, namely, the poor.
On the other hand, low participation ratio of the SHG Program in Village M 
suggests the importance of good management of SHGs and adequate support of 
banks or NGOs for this sake. Without experienced and well-functioning SHGs, 
there will be no scope that the SHG Program will develop in Village M, or 
generally speaking in Maharashtra. Existing SHGs in Village M are supported by a 
few voluntary ‘‘coordinators’’ in the village. But more systematic and firm support 
system like Indira Kranti Patham and SERP in AP seems to be the essential 
condition to extend the SHG Program especially to the poor.
5 Conclusion
Due to a strong initiative and elaborate support of the government, the SHG 
Program has spread rapidly to every corner of rural area and majority of rural 
households are now involved in this program in AP State. For the beneficiaries, 
this program provides not only cheap loan but also other various services like 
savings facility, pension scheme, subsidized gas, and scholarship for children’s 
education. Although the amount of loans compared with their total credit need is 
very little, its interest rate is much lower than the loans from money lenders and 
friends/relatives. Thus, most of SHG members feel that the SHG Program is 
beneficial to them. However, the amount and frequency of SHG loans are far less 
than their need which drives villagers go for other loan sources including usurious 
money lenders and relentless micro finance.7 In order to solve the mismatch of 
credit demand and supply and to increase the effect of poverty alleviation, banks 
are expected to give bigger and frequent loans to SHGs. But this requires SHGs to 
enhance their capacity as effective financial intermediaries which have stronger 
assessing, monitoring, and enforcement power.
Moreover, many poor households are still excluded from the SHG Program due 
to poverty (lack of saving capacity) and age limit etc. In order to include these 
poor and aged households, the design of this program needs to be improved.
In Maharashtra State where Village M is situated, the SHG Program is not very 
active as in AP State, although most of present members appreciate the benefit of 
this program to some extent. The problems of the SHG Program in Village M 
suggest the factors causing its inactivity and the challenges this program is facing 
in Maharashtra. Lack or inadequate support system for the management of SHGs 
seems to be the main cause of inactivity and unpopularity of this program. Due to 
weak management of SHGs, many groups have dissolved and villagers’ trust on
7 One of SHG leaders in Village A told the author that one micro finance institution has come 
and started lending in this village recently. Although it charges higher interest rate and weekly 
collection of loans is inflexible and relentless, some people have to borrow from it because loans 
from SHGs do not satisfy their credit need.
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the SHG Program has been lost. These weak SHGs make the banks hesitate to give 
large and frequent loans to SHGs, which again reduces villagers’ expectation 
toward the SHG Program. As a consequence, the program is thrown into the 
vicious circle of weaker management of SHGs and lack of impact especially on 
achieving poverty alleviation and more equitable development.
In conclusion, putting aside the discussion about efficiency and viability of the 
program, the SHG Program can be a more effective tool for delivering various 
financial services to the rural poor and for effective poverty alleviation. But the key 
factor for success of this program is the firm and well-functioning SHGs as 
financial intermediary institutions. In order to strengthen the management of 
SHGs, they need to be more sufficiently supported by banks/NGOs/government 
institutions especially with respect to capacity building on management, book­
keeping, monitoring, and enforcement of loan repayment. As Geertz (1962) argued 
the role of ROSCAs in financial development, keeping the advantage of flexible 
informal self organizations, SHGs must learn the financial discipline, so that they 
can play more vital role to deliver formal financial services to the rural area 
especially to the rural poor.
In order to extend the SHG Program to areas/states/countries where it does not 
exist or has not developed well, experiences of AP and Maharashtra provide 
lessons on what works and what does not work. The different results of the AP and 
Maharashtra experiences reflect the differences in government policies, manage­
ment of SHGs, culture, etc. If properly designed and implemented, the SHG 
Program will have a much bigger impact on inclusion of the poor, poverty alle­
viation, and equitable development not only in India but in South Asia where 500 
million people still live in sheer poverty.
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